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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tinues to disallow probable cause as a defense in all false arrest
and false imprisonment cases. However, West Virginia has pro-
vided a statute making shoplifting a breach of the peace and giving
private persons the right to arrest for this act if committed in their
presence.
Esdel Beane Yost
ABSTRACTS
Adoption - Rights of Inheritance of Natural Child of Adopted Child
C, the natural child of A who was adopted, is contesting the
will of A's adopting mother. The trial court held that C was not
a lawful lineal descendant of the testator, A's adopting mothers, and
thus not able to contest the will. Held, reversed. The right of
adopted children to have their children inherit under the statute of
descent and distribution was one of the rights included in the statutory
amendment which abolished any remaining distinctions between
the legal rights of a natural and an adopted child. In re Miner's
Estate, 103 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 1960).
In 1959, the West Virginia Legislature amended the former
code provision which deprived adopted children of the rights to take
from lineal kindred of the adopting parents by representation. W. Va.
Acts 1959, ch. 47. W. VA. CODE, ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Michie Supp.
1960). See Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va.
703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946), interpreting the section prior to amend-
ment.
The pertinent Michigan statute does not specifically provide
for the fact situation presented in the principal case nor does the
West Virginia statute as it now reads. However, the West Virginia
statute, like the Michigan statute, does entitle the adopted child to
"all the rights and privileges of a natural child of the adopting
parents...." Further, the West Virginia statute gives the adopted
child the same rights of inheritance from his adoptive parents and
the parents' lineal kindred as though he were a natural child of
the adopting parents. It also provides for the adopted child's inte-
state property to pass as though he were a natural child of the
adopting parents. Thus by analogy with the reasoning of the princi-
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pal case, it seems fairly certain that the West Virginia statute would
be interpreted to allow a natural child to inherit by representation
from his parent's adopting parent.
Criminal Law -Effect of Judgment When One Count Is
Improper
Appellant was convicted of larceny and of receiving the same
stolen property, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the
latter sentence was vacated, but the court stated that this was not
sufficient grounds for reversal of the judgment and upheld the
larceny sentence. Held, affirmed. The case falls within the rule
of affirmance of the judgment where one count is proper and is
sufficient to support the judgment, even though there is an improper
conviction on another count. Milanovich v. United States, 215 F.2d
716 (4th Cir. 1960).
There was a vigorous dissent in the principal case on the theory
that as the conviction was improper on both counts conjointly, it
was for the jury, upon proper instructions, to select the count for
conviction, and the court by refusing the reversal exercised a jury
function. The dissent distinguishes the principal case where the
counts were interrelated from the cases -involving independent counts
cited by the majority as support for its conclusion. Hirabayashi V.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
Another case, Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), was
distinguished by the fact that the court was only asked that the re-
ceiving sentence be struck down. It was an appeal from a convic-
tion, not an attempt to revive a sentence.
Further, though there appears to be no federal cases exactly
in point, there are several state cases which have dealt with the
problem. The decided majority of the state cases have granted
rei'ersal. Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12 (1928); Tobin
v. State, 104 Ill. 565 (1882); Commonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass.
60 (1880); In re Franklin, 77 Mich. 615, 43 N.W. 997 (1889).
Though the general rule grants affirmance of a proper count where
another count with concurrent sentence is held invalid, a plausible
exception to this, following the state cases, would require reversal
where the verdict is inconsistent.
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Criminal Law- West Virginia Cumulative Sentences Statute
Relator had been sentenced under two prior convictions when
convicted a third time. The court made no provision for the be-
ginning of the sentence in the last conviction, believing the sentence
to be life imprisonment under the habitual criminal act. However,
the habitual criminal act was found inapplicable and thus the life
sentence invalid. This case came to the West Virginia Supreme
Court on an original habeas corpus proceeding. Held, that the
case is not within the purview of W. VA. CODE, ch. 61, art. 11, §
21 (Michie 1955), and consequently must be decided from the com-
mon law which holds that the sentences are to run concurrently unless
expressly provided to the contrary. State ex rel. Yokum v. Adams,
114 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1960).
The West Virginia Code provides that sentences will run con-
secutively unless otherwise expressed "when any person is convicted
of two or more offenses, before sentence is pronounced for either.
• . ." W. VA. CODE, ch. 61, art. 11, § 21 (Michie 1955). The
statute is clearly confined in scope to situations where the last con-
viction occurs before sentencing for prior convictions. However,
two prior West Virginia decisions seem to have overlooked this
obvious limitation. The first of these is State ex rel. Medley v. Skeen,
138 W. Va. 409, 76 S.E.2d 146 (1953). The fact situation was
substantially identical to that of the principal case and though
the last conviction was subsequent to sentencing on other convictions,
the term for the former was held to run consecutively with the earlier
terms. The basis given for the decision was the previously cited
statute. The other case is State ex rel. Kuhn v. Adams, 143 W. Va.
551, 103 S.E.2d 530 (1958), which relied on State ex rel. Medley,
supra. The court stated that because of the statute West Virginia
is contra to the common law majority which presumes concurrent
sentences. 15 AM. JUR. Criminal Law § 465 (1938); Annot., 70
A.L.R. 1511 (1931).
Though the principal case did not expressly overrule the prior
decisions, it should be considered as properly confining the scope
of the West Virginia statute.
Property - Adverse Possession - Mistaken Possession Beyond
the True Line
Appellants occupied the land in dispute under the mistaken
belief that it was part of the tract covered by their deed. The
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trial court below held this insufficient to establish adverse posses-
sion. Held, affirmed. To gain title by adverse possession it is
essential that the possession be hostile which necessarily includes
the intention to dispossess the owner. Mistaken possession beyond
the true line to which the possessor intends to claim is not hostile.
Lynch v. Lynch, 115 S.E.2d 301 (S.C. 1960).
The principal case is in accord with the majority view that
whether possession is adverse is dependent on the possessor's intent
with respect to ownership; possession up to a supposed line beyond
the true line with intent to hold only to the latter is only hostile
to the true line.
However, there are several cases contra, holding that posses-
sion mistakenly beyond the true line is hostile and can ultimately
ripen into title. Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76
N.W.2d 355 (1956).
West Virginia seems to follow the minority view in holding
that mistaken possession beyond the true line, though not sufficient
to establish adverse possession under the color of title, does give
the possessor the requisite hostility for that which he actually pos-
sesses. Greathouse v. Linger, 98 W. Va. 220, 222, 127 S.E. 31,
32 (1925); Heavner v. Morgan, 41 W. Va. 428, 440, 23 S.E. 874,
878 (1895). Though West Virginia requires intent as a necessary
element of adverse possession, Core v. Faupel, 24 W. Va. 238, 244
(1883), apparently mere intent to possess that actually occupied
is sufficient, even though mistaken as to ownership and not actually
intending to dispossess anyone.
Robert Glenn Lilly, Jr.
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